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ABSTRACT 
AstroTurfing and its online equivalent CyberTurfing not only pose a significant threat to 
consumers, but democratic discourse. Regulatory measures in place to prevent deceptive 
marketing do not grasp the nature of the threat. It is argued that people make decisions 
about consumer purchases by using heuristics - mental shortcuts and other rules of thumbs. 
When making decisions, consumers and voters are often relying on incomplete and false 
information spread as part of an AstroTurfing campaign. Digitally mediated platforms are 
being manipulated by propagators to help spread false messages in order to advance 
specific agendas. As a result, consumer trust and democratic discourse are both 
undermined. It is argued that further regulation is required to combat the deceptive practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the phenomenon known as 'AstroTurfing', and specifically its online 
equivalent 'CyberTurfing' and other forms of online persuasion. It starts from the position 
that information technology academics have spent so much time analysing subversion, 
intrusions, and disruption by both State and business actors in private spheres that there has 
been a failure to conduct a proper examination of how the same actors use various digitally 
mediated platforms already in existence to advance their own commercial and political 
interests. The focus of this article is 'CyberTurfing' - the online equivalent of AstroTurfing - a 
form of stealth marketing designed to appear to be as a kind of bottom-up activism that in 
reality is powered by someone else behind the scenes. 'CyberTurfing' is the practice by state 
actors and commercial entities using digitally mediated platforms to facilitate a commercial 
benefit or to advance a political objective. The theoretical framework for the paper is 
provided by two very different narratives of the regulation of cyberspace: Castell's 
networked individualism and Kahneman and Tversky's theory of heuristics in judgement 
making. The first part of the paper provides a brief history of AstroTurfing, before 
introducing its online equivalent and other forms of digitally mediated persuasion. The 
second part of the paper analyses the regulatory and legal framework surrounding 
CyberTurfing and other forms of online persuasion campaigns. The next section 
differentiates between two different types of AstroTurfing: that done for commercial gain 
and that for the purpose of shaping political influence, concluding that under our current 
regulatory regime the former is largely regulated, yet suffers from regulatory failings while 
the latter is, for the most part, not. The paper argues that while commercial CyberTurfing is 
at least on regulators' radar, CyberTurfing campaigns for political benefit are far more 
disruptive to democratic discourse. When a campaign is undertaken to advance a political 
agenda, campaign or ideology, any organisations offering these services do so for a 
commercial benefit and therefore should be subjected to regulatory oversight. Accordingly, 
the final section proposes a framework for regulating CyberTurfing and a regulatory 
solution that allows regulators to protect "politically neutral" and "innocent" platforms. 
ASTROTURFING 
AstroTurfing is a deceptive practice often deployed by marketers to create the false 
impression that a campaign has developed organically (the grass-roots in AstroTurf are 
fake[2]). 'Classic' AstroTurfing involves the use of paid agents to falsely represent popular 
sentiment surrounding a product or service. As a result, consumers 'follow the herd'. [3] Its 
deployment in advertising and marketing contexts is subject to regulatory oversight. 
AstroTurfing campaigns have two distinct characteristics: first, it involves the use of 
deception to disguise the true origins behind what is really an orchestrated campaign and 
second, a lack of transparency hides the identity of the campaign's backers. It appears to 
outsiders as existing only through a spontaneous upwelling of public opinion, reducing 
effort required for rational thinking. 'Modern' forms of AstroTurfing comes in the form of 
stealth campaigns designed to gain mass acceptance for a commercial benefit or a political 
ideology. AstroTurfing campaigns deceive people into thinking that support for a claim or a 
product/service appears to be organic in nature, and has formed through a natural ground-
swelling of support of otherwise unconnected parties. Due to the lack of transparency found 
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in any AstroTurfing campaign, its victims are unaware that support has really been 
manipulated by an unidentified source. Often it is believed that the source of information 
often comes from a credible, unaffiliated entity, yet in reality the campaign is designed to 
withhold the true backers of the strategy. As de Figueiredo states, "Strategic behaviour by 
interest groups can make it seem that individuals are participating in the rulemaking when 
organized interests are actually pulling the strings."[4] As the true identity behind the source 
of the campaign is withheld, any regulation of AstroTurfing has historically been justified on 
the basis that there has been a deception of otherwise rational actors. Its practice has been 
referred to and defined in terms of advertising: it is a false form of grass-roots marketing 
that makes the illusion of grass-roots support in supporting a consumer product. Others 
define AstroTurfing as a "guise concerning the use of endorsements and testimonials in 
advertising" through "material connections".[5] The Canadian Competition Bureau defines 
AstroTurfing in an advertising context as referring to "the practice of creating commercial 
representations that masquerade as the authentic experiences and opinions of impartial 
consumers, such as fake consumer reviews and testimonials". [6] 
Its origin has been traced back to the early 20th Century by sociologist Caroline Lee who 
identified one of the first AstroTurfing campaigns was a drive to get people to discard their 
"tin dipper", a metal cup to dip water from the well bucket, to a cheaper renewable waxed 
paper cup.[7] The social movement, spearheaded in a small militant pamphlet called 
the Cup-Campaigner, never disclosed that the pamphlet was printed by Hugh Moore, the co-
founder of the Public Cup Vendor Company which would rename itself later to 'Dixie Cup 
Company'. [8] Not exactly sounding out of place today, the social message within the Cup 
Campaigner urged citizens to "join the fight" to "banish the most prolific medium for 
spreading disease". [9] 
Throughout the 1990s AstroTurfing's use as a form of public relations and reputation 
management grew. After health advocates mobilized against the dangers of tobacco use, the 
tobacco industry counter-mobilized through the National Smokers Alliance (NSA), a public 
relations created front group funded by the tobacco industry. Part of Microsoft's strategy for 
defending itself against an anti-trust case [10] was funding the Americans for Technology 
Leadership (ATL). The group orchestrated a fake poll and sent letters sympathetic to 
Microsoft in order to convince lawmakers that there was public support for a sympathetic 
ruling. [11] Therefore, it is unsurprising that campaigners and activists, businesses and 
politicians would transition from relying on the use of letters and 'robocalls' to digitally 
mediated platforms where the ease and reach has infinite potential. Not only are we living 
in an ever connected world, propagators can take advantage of the Internet's speed and 
lower transaction costs to manipulate discourse, advance their political agenda, or increase 
commercial awareness of a product. The lack of transparency in the online environment 
allows propagators to circumvent present regulations preventing 'classic' 
AstroTurfing. [12] As the source behind an online campaign is not identifiable, the online 
version of the phenomenon not only disrupts the information 
seeking rational actor[13] during commercial transactions, but has the potential for 
disrupting genuine political discourse, empower 'information entrepreneurs' wanting to 
spread disinformation [14], and facilitate digital wildfires and online forms of moral panic. 
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In addition to the multiple ethical issues it raises, AstroTurfing should also be seen as a 
significant threat to the legitimacy of genuine grassroots movements. 
CYBERTURFING 
A successful online CyberTurfing campaign shares some characteristics with its offline 
equivalent. First, the viral manner in which the deception spreads. One the seed is planted, 
the message spreads virally, growing exponentially, while hiding the true origins of the 
source. After the initial seeding, the message travels by contagion. Even with a minimum 
amount of seeding, small campaigns can turn into mass movements. [15] People simply 
don't know they are participating in a highly organised, yet deceptive and manipulative 
campaign. The second characteristic is the deceptive nature of the campaign. As a result, 
people who read a CyberTurfing message are not aware of the material connection between 
the misleading message and the source. 
AstroTurfing's online equivalent, CyberTurfing, comes in numerous forms: consider the 
'folksy' online blog that appeared to be written by 'Jim and Laura' whereby they reported on 
their experiences driving their recreational vehicle across America spending the night in 
Wal-Mart parking lots, and reporting how happy Wal-Mart employees appeared to be. The 
blog did not mention that Working Families for Wal-Mart, an entity formed by Wal-Mart's 
public relations firm, paid for the entire enterprise. When exposed by Business Week, the PR 
firm acknowledged an error. As part of a campaign to boost the biotechnology giant 
Monsanto's image, a consultancy group fabricated emails and created "The Center for Food 
and Agricultural Research", a fake institute designated for the purpose of attacking 
Monsanto's critics.[16] This was one of the early corporate responses to the growing role of 
the internet in encouraging anti-corporate protests. In addition to Monsanto, Microsoft and 
Wal-Mart, Sony and Belkin have also been caught AstroTurfing consumers online. 
When AstroTurfers were able to take advantage of digitally mediated platforms, 
CyberTurfers found their natural home. Ratkiewicz et al began tracking bots sending up to 
10,000 tweets a month.[17] Some accounts were setup and subsequently identified as 'honey 
pots' to attract followers. These were relatively easy to identify as fake accounts - they had 
either pre-programmed times to tweet message or periods of heavy usage. They relied 
heavily on hashtags to connect to other legitimate users or to enter and become part of 
ongoing conversations. They often used blacklisted URLs and spam words. An obvious 
characteristic of a bot or fake account was that they actually weren't very social at all. They 
had few friends, making them easy to identify. Bots can engage users on social media in real 
time and are capable of using natural language. They can be simplistic in nature or engage 
in complex conversations. Users of social media sites like Twitter have had unsolicited 
contact from simple versions of bots and maybe even actually engaged in conversations 
with users that they thought were real, but were really advanced bots. Some bots can be 
programmed with such precision to appear to be a sophisticated interlocutor. Some also 
recognize and respond to user emotions, including frustration and depression. [18] Others 
can sense patterns in affective expression and can send prompting stimuli to gauge human 
reaction.[19]Some are capable of deceiving people through a pre-programmed algorithm 
that fools people into thinking that the bot is capable of displayinghuman emotions or has, 
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at the very least, internal mechanisms analogous to human or animal emotions. Bots can be 
programmed in a variety of ways, including searching and replying to tweets in response to 
a series of pre-programmed words and/or phrases. With relative low effort, a bot can be 
programmed to respond and engage with people punctuating their tweets with a Twitter 
'hashtag' which helps organize tweets about similar topics. It can be programmed to seek 
out influential users in various environments by contacting them directly, with the aim of 
getting the users to share his commercial message. The bot, usually followed by a small 
number of other users, has little social gravitas in the online environment. Its aim is to 
spread the message to other users by taking advantage of their online influence. By targeting 
people with thousands of followers, it can help to facilitate a marketing and advertising 
campaign, or start a cascade among other social media users that spreads positive, negative, 
or disinformation. 
The manipulation of a digitally mediated platform in order to advance a specific agenda, 
product, or political ideology advance an agenda is becoming a frequent occurrence. 
Although AstroTurfing is subject to regulation, in the online environment, CyberTurfing is 
much more difficult to detect and with potential for far greater consequences. Any attempts 
to regulate have ramifications for how we use digitally mediated platforms, commerce and 
consumer law, and fundamental rights of expression. 
WHY CYBERTURFING IS A PROBLEM 
Bots programmed to facilitate a CyberTurfing campaign take advantage of features of the 
online environment where they reside and our reliance to deploy heuristics when making 
judgments. A common error arising across various digital media platforms comes from our 
reliance on the repetition heuristic. We deploy this mental shortcut believing that more 
people report a claim, the greater its credibility. [20] In a series of experiments, a piece of 
favourable information is repeated across several subjects (strengthening its credibility). 
This is the common knowledge condition. In the hidden profile condition, the same piece of 
favourable information is held by only one of the subjects (weakening its credibility). Since 
repetition across sources bolsters credibility, it is no surprise that repeated pieces of 
information are more persuasive than unique pieces of information in the experiment: the 
common knowledge effect is not as shocking as it seems. The repetition heuristic is fallible; a 
more costly requirement to offer and consider reasons for each bit of information is more 
likely to yield a better group judgement than intuitive tallying of their frequencies of 
mention; however, one of the hazards is the risk of the increased use of hidden profiles and 
the resulting common knowledge effect. Information and repetition entrepreneurs use a 
range of tactics to take advantage of our reliance of these type of heuristics to create either 
"norm bandwagons" or "norm cascades".[21] Norm bandwagons occur when small shifts 
lead to large ones, as people join the "bandwagon"; norm cascades occur when there are 
rapid shifts in norms. Unsurprisingly, propagators have tapped into certain characteristics 
of the online environment by developing strategies across digitally mediated platforms that 
take advantage of our reliance on heuristics. 
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REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Any interference of speech undoubtedly courts controversy. In the US, current commercial 
first amendment jurisprudence is in flux and courts have refused to settle on a set of 
doctrinal rules permitting the banning speech when its content and context would mislead a 
certain segment of the population. This is largely in part due to the recognition that courts 
are not experts in psychology and are unable to "intuit the differences between good and 
bad law". [22] On the other hand, regulators, who may be experts, are faced with developing 
"prophylactic rules" that rely on hindsight[23], susceptible to behavioural biases[24] and 
regulatory capture. [25] In order to combat deceptive advertisements and business practices, 
reputable agencies self-regulate themselves to avoid reputational damage for misleading 
and deceptive advertising. In the US, federal legislation permits a business that feels that 
they have been harmed through the deceptive and misleading practices of one of its 
competitors can bring an action under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 1946.[26] 
REGULATION OF DECEPTIVE COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE US 
The main source of direct regulation for advertising is the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
which can initiate its own investigation about deceptive or misleading practices; issue "cease 
and desist" orders, and impose fines for serious violations. Advertisements whose messages 
are false or related to committing crimes are easy enough to spot; however, most issues 
before the FTC deal with advertisements the commission believes may be deceptive or 
misleading. The FTC applies a three-part definition in order to determine what is deceptive. 
First there must be a "material representation, omission, or practice" to be assessed. Material 
means that the advertisement has made a claim that is likely to affect whether the consumer 
is likely to buy the product or service. Material statements do not have to be made explicitly; 
for example, a speaker in a television ad dressed in a white lab coat surrounded by medical 
charts while promoting a health product was found to be a material representation. [27] The 
fact that the spokesperson was not a doctor satisfied the second part of the FTC's definition, 
the material representation, omission, or practice must be "likely to mislead a consumer". 
"Likely" is assessed on a sliding scale, depending on the FTC's view on how sophisticated 
the advertisement's intended audience is about advertising and media. Some false 
statements, like puffery [28] and pure opinion, are not deceptive. For example, a certain 
brand of golf balls that claimed that it would send your "drives into the stratosphere" is not 
confusing, as no-one "acting reasonably under the circumstances" would believe the 
'outlandish' claims about the flight of a golf ball. The FTC tends to believe that the public is 
quite savvy about advertising techniques and skeptical of their messages. The fact that some 
gullible or inattentive consumers fall for the deceptive or misleading claims made does not 
prove the advertisement was deceptive or misleading. Only if the material statements would 
be misleading to a reasonable consumer will the advertisement lose its First Amendment 
protection and be subject to punishment by the FTC.[29] This is an objective reality; in 
theory, an ad can be deceptive even if the misleading claims fool no one and the ad might be 
non-deceptive, even though some consumers might be misled. 
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REGULATION OF DECEPTIVE COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN THE UK 
In Europe, deceptive commercial speech is regulated by both the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive (UCPD) and national advertising codes. When corporations deploy this 
type of deception as a marketing strategy, it is considered a misleading commercial practice 
under the UCPD. The practice is specifically blacklisted as 'falsely claiming or creating the 
impression that the trader is not acting for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or 
profession, or falsely representing oneself as a consumer' is to be considered unfair in all 
circumstances. In the UK Regulations 12 and 13 of the Consumer Protection from Unfair 
Trading Regulations 2008 (enforced by the OFT and local authorities) make this a criminal 
offence, punishable by a fine of up to £5,000 and/or (on indictment) a prison sentence of up 
to two years. AstroTurfing is regulated for two reasons: it interferes with 
the rational or average consumer and it is deceptive and misleading at its core. It adds more 
transaction costs to consumers searching to make informed decisions. Those seeking to 
make informed decisions about the products and services they buy are unwillingly being 
influenced by organized interests pulling the strings behind the scenes.[30] 
The UCDP only protects consumers' (B2C) economic interests (as opposed to moral 
interests) and does not concern unfair commercial practices which may damage business' 
economic interests (B2B), for there is at this time no clear consensus in Europe on the 
harmonisation of unfair competition rules. [31] The Directive provides an extensive list of 
definitions of the key concepts. The consumer is defined as "any natural person who, in 
commercial practices covered by this directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his 
trade, business, craft or profession"[32], while the trader is defined as being "any natural or 
legal person who, in commercial practices covered by this directive, is acting for purposes 
relating to his trade, business, craft or profession and anyone acting in the name of or on 
behalf of a trader"[33]. A consumer is limited to "a natural person", while a trader must be 
either a natural or a legal person. The term "product" is defined in a broad matter as "any 
goods or service including immovable property, rights and obligations"[34]. The UCPD's 
Annex I contains a 'black list' covering all media, including the Internet.[35] Under No. 22 of 
the list, "falsely claiming or creating the impression that the trader is not acting for purposes 
relating to his trade, business, craft or profession, or falsely representing oneself as a 
consumer" shall constitute a misleading practice. Number 11 bans using editorial content in 
the media to promote a product where a trader has paid for the promotion without making 
that clear in the content or by images or sounds clearly identifiable by the consumer 
(advertorial) is also a banned practice under the Directive.[36] 
Although there are significant differences between the way the US and Europe regulate 
speech, there are some similarities. At the time of the enactment of the UCPD in Europe, in 
the United States regulating commercial speech was well established. The Federal Trade 
Commission's regulations, first published in 1980, were updated to address social media and 
word-of-mouth marketing[37] including AstroTurfing[38] in 2009. The FTC's guidance 
highlighted the need to "distinguish between the honest word of mouth shared among 
actual consumers from marketing messages spread by controlled consumer endorsers" [39]. 
The FTC also considered the types of reviews and endorsements commonly left by bloggers 
and professional reviewers under the guidance. If the author of a review received payment 
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or in-kind payment such as free products, such endorsement must be disclosed.[40] A 
Tennessee company named Legacy Learning Systems, Inc. was fined $250,000 and given 
further sanctions for hiring affiliate marketers to write positive reviews on a DVD they had 
released [41]. The affiliates did not disclose they were getting paid for the praise they 
heaped on the educational DVD series called "Learn and Master Guitar". The FTC 
subsequently ruled the advertisements deceptive and illegal. In a similar case, the FTC 
reached a settlement with Reverb Communications, a PR firm that posted false reviews by 
having employees pose as ordinary consumers posting game reviews in Apple's iTunes 
store, without disclosing that the reviews came from paid employees working on behalf of 
the game developers. [42] The agency also issued a warning to fashion retailer Ann Taylor 
after the company gave gifts to bloggers, but closed the investigation without taking 
action. [43] In such cases, the authorities considered that "the bloggers concerned were 
engaging in hidden commercial practices." The abuse of online reputation management is 
prevalent in the digital era: Yelp, a well-known online review site, has faced a barrage of 
lawsuits regarding its business practices. Last year, the Wall Street Journal received a 
Freedom of Information Act [44] response from the FTC outlining the fact they had received 
2,046 complaints against Yelp between 2008 and 2014.[45] 
Any violations of the FTC's guidelines for appropriate use of social media may prompt an 
investigation. The FTC started investigatory proceedings against fashion company Cole 
Haan in 2014 after the company organised a competition on Pinterest, a 'personalised media 
platform' that allows media to 'pin' things that they like to their user boards. The company 
offered a cash prize to the Pinterest user that designed the most creative board using the 
company's brand of shoes. The FTC ruled that the boards were endorsements of Cole Haan 
shoes and launched an inquiry into the company's failure to instruct contestants to label 
their Pinterest "pins" to clarify that the display of Cole Haan products was part of a contest 
to win a cash prize. The investigation was the first instance where the FTC found that entry 
into a contest was a "material connection" under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC typically 
reserves its resources to combat more egregious violators, and a small company's 
inadvertent or minor infraction is not a likely target. But even a minor slap on the wrist can 
quickly become a public relations nightmare for a franchise system because the FTC 
publicizes every settlement in a press release. In addition, if similar violations exist across 
multiple franchises or if the FTC identifies a pattern of violations, an entire franchise system 
may be subject to heightened scrutiny or investigation. 
While the FTC publishes guides and can bring enforcement action against rogue traders, 
they are not the only actors capable of raising an action. For the most part, the FTC takes a 
hands-off approach and tends to let industry regulate itself. [46] Fines will be issued for non-
compliance, but only after a warning has been issued. The FTC will only proclaim a practice 
unfair if injury to the consumer cannot reasonably be avoided. [47] When the Commission 
does go after a company, it is usually a larger one; according to Mary Engel (Associate 
Director for Advertising Practices at the FTC), "certain cases involving smaller local or 
regional businesses may be more appropriately resolved by a state attorney general's 
office."[48] At least two states have taken actions against companies for AstroTurfing and 
violating essential principles of the FTC's guidelines. State investigations of AstroTurfing, 
defined in Lifestyle Lift as the practice of "preparing or disseminating a false or deceptive 
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review that a reasonable consumer would believe to be a neutral, third-party 
review"[49] increased following the 2009 settlement between the Florida Attorney General's 
Office and the cosmetic surgery company Lifestyle Lift. [50] AstroTurfing is a violation of 
multiple state laws prohibiting false advertising and illegal and deceptive business practices. 
The state of Florida took action against Lifestyle Lift, which at the time of the settlement had 
over forty locations throughout the United States. The company had combatted negative 
postings on message boards by having employees create false accounts on online message 
boards and review sites for the purpose of posting positive reviews and comments about 
their employer and its services. The Florida Attorney General's Office uncovered emails 
proving that Lifestyle Lift gave employees guidance about how to pose as satisfied 
customers online. In addition to posting false reviews, these employees also attacked 
legitimate critical or negative customer reviews. As part of the settlement, Lifestyle Lift 
agreed to pay $300,000 in penalties and costs to the State of Florida and cease posting 
anonymous, false positive reviews about its business. The Attorney General's Office called 
Lifestyle Lift's practices cynical, manipulative, and illegal and pledged to continue its 
mission to protect customers from "emerging fraud and deception, including 'AstroTurfing' 
on the Internet." 
In another example of state action to clamp down on fake reviews, in 2013 the Attorney 
General's Office of the State of New York undertook an investigation called Operation Clean 
Turf which resulted in a $350,000 settlement with nineteen companies and an agreement that 
they would stop selling fake reviews to businesses for posting on online review sites like 
Yelp and Citysearch. The offending companies were third-party providers of fake reviews 
that marketed themselves as search engine optimization companies (SEOs) offering online 
reputation management services. As part of the investigation, representatives from the 
Attorney General's Office made prospective phone calls to companies advertising 
themselves as "Search Engine Optimisation Companies" posing as potential clients looking 
to bolster their online reputations. They wanted help rebutting negative reviews posted on 
the Internet. A number of the SEOs immediately offered to write false reviews and post 
them on sites like Yelp and Citysearch, even publicizing the fraud by advertising on Craig's 
List for people to "post multiple positive reviews on major review [sic] sites." Owners of a 
spa advertised: "I need someone who is a Yelp expert to post positive reviews…." A 
nightclub publicized that it was looking for writers to post reviews "without getting 
flagged". [51] In the end, 19 companies were assigned fines. These ranged from $2,500 to 
$100,000, for a total of $350,000 in penalties. In addition, all of the firms entered into an 
assurance of discontinuance. [52] 
In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) encountered similar business practices.[53] The 
OFT's accused Handpicked Media Ltd of violating Regulation 3(4) (b) under the provisions 
of Regulation 6 of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 after an 
investigation determined Handpicked Media had engaged a network of bloggers to post on 
niche websites across various sectors that published "online content which promoted the 
activities of Handpicked Media's clients, without sufficient disclosures in place to make it 
clearly identifiable to consumers that the promotions had been paid for."[54] The OFT took 
the view that not disclosing who was behind promotional tweets was deceptive and 
misleading to consumers. In another case, the OFT accepted legal undertakings from 
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MoreNiche Limited regarding potential violations of Regulation of 3(4) (b) and behaviour 
that constituted a violation of paragraph 11 and paragraph 22 of Schedule 1 of the CPRs.[55] 
The Advertising Standards Agency (ASA) investigated the Mars Chocolate Co Ltd brand 
Snickers' 'You're not yourself when you're hungry' Twitter campaign after it was referred for 
misleading consumers under 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4 of the CAP Code. Complainants said that a 
series of out-of-character celebrity tweets were not readily identifiable as a marketing 
communications. Katie Price and Rio Ferdinand tweeted references to news events that 
seemed out of step with their normal tweeting profile. The final of a series of tweets referred 
to Snickers with the hashtag #Spon. In March 2012 the ASA cleared the campaign as the 
reveal tweet made clear it was a marketing communication - and was the only one to 
involve the product. [56]Conversely, In June 2012 the ASA upheld a complaint against the 
Nike #makeitcount campaign under the same provisions of the CAP Code. Manchester 
United's Wayne Rooney tweeted "My resolution - to start the year as a champion, and finish 
it as a champion...#makeitcount gonike.me/makeitcount". Footballer Jack Wilshere tweeted 
"In 2012, I will come back for my club - and be ready for my country. 
#makeitcount.gonike.me/makeitcount". The ASA found that the tweets from footballers 
were under the marketers control and did not make clear that they were marketing 
communications. By November 2013, the ASA was prompted by the problem of bloggers' 
misleading consumers through promotional writing enough to publish "Blurring Advertising 
and Blogs - Why it pays to know the ad rules". [57] In response to the Highlighted Media case, 
the Internet Advertising Bureau and the Incorporated Society of British Advertisers issued 
guidelines on the payment of editorial content to promote brands within social media. [58] 
THE CASE FOR FURTHER REGULATING CYBERTURFING 
Despite acting as basis for most policy making in the latter half of the 20th Century, human 
beings are not rational actors. [59] Rather, when presented with complicated decisions, we 
often deploy a series of mental shortcuts to overcome our laziness and lack of ability to 
access complete information. Kahneman and Tversky's work on cognitive thinking made the 
case that "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex 
tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgemental 
operations."[60] These heuristics may be efficient but are sometimes inaccurate procedures 
for solving a problem. Humans are actually quite poor at decision making, regardless of the 
information available. They expressed concerns that various constituents have proven to be 
poor at maximising utility; for example, jurors use of mental heuristics when ascertaining 
facts during trials and legislators acting on their perceived policy preferences of 
voters.[61] These mechanisms are usually constructed from primitive mental capacities and 
developed over a lifetime of experiences. They tell us what information to seek out or select 
in the environment and how to integrate several sources of information to infer the 
characteristics of events that are not directly available to perception.[62] When we encounter 
a situation when we need to use judgement, we select a cognitive tool that is suited to the 
judgement. We use heuristic strategies because we are generally mentally lazy and in most 
instances, result in good outcomes. However, although heuristics are generally useful, on 
occasion their use leads to "severe and systematic" errors. [63] 
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Bots, looking to bring about a commercial benefit, take advantage of the automation and our 
reliance on heuristics. For example, a common error that arises from the repetition heuristic 
is the incorrect assumption that the more people that report a claim, the greater its 
credibility. [64] In a series of experiments, a piece of favourable information is repeated 
across several subjects (strengthening its credibility). This is the common knowledge 
condition. In the hidden profile condition, the same piece of favourable information is held 
by only one of the subjects (weakening its credibility). Since repetition across sources 
bolsters credibility, it is no surprise that repeated pieces of information are more persuasive 
than unique pieces of information in the experiment: the common knowledge effect is not as 
shocking as it seems. The repetition heuristic is fallible; a more costly requirement to offer 
and consider reasons for each bit of information is more likely to yield a better group 
judgement than intuitive tallying of their frequencies of mention; however, one of the 
hazards is the risk of the increased use of hidden profiles and the resulting common 
knowledge effect. Information and repetition entrepreneurs use a range of tactics to take 
advantage of our reliance of these type of heuristics to create either "norm bandwagons" or 
"norm cascades".[65] Norm bandwagons occur when small shifts lead to large ones, as 
people join the "bandwagon"; norm cascades occur when there are rapid shifts in norms. 
Unsurprisingly, propagators have tapped into certain characteristics of the online 
environment by developing strategies across digitally mediated platforms that take 
advantage of our reliance on heuristics. 
MIT technologist Nicholas Negroponte prophesised that a new user-created and formatted 
method of communication would develop called the "Daily Me ".[66] The "Daily Me" would 
allow users some autonomy to filter what they would read every day. While some 
applauded this as a tool of ease and convenience, Castells us to pause and ask, "How will 
the increasing control of private powers affect democracy"?[67] Castells queried how 
emerging technologies affect the growing power of consumers to ?lter what they see? He 
sees an essential part of the democratic experience as coming from exposure to ideas that 
one wouldn't encounter on his own and secondly, citizens should have a range of common 
experiences that make up part of our shared collective knowledge. One form of 
CyberTurfing seeks to influence the "Daily Me" as proprietors of CyberTurfing platforms 
seek out influential users in the hope that they will re-share the false story. 
The "Daily Me", in Castell's view would make it possible to filter the Internet's vast streams 
of accessible information. As people organized their "Daily Me", they would select and 
categorize information that only appealed to their interests. However, as a result they will 
likely use these filtering mechanisms to reinforce peoples' prejudices and isolation. This type 
of group polarization would result in the entrenchment of a certain type of ideals reducing 
the ability to participate in meaningful deliberative democracy. For Sunstein the best way 
for deliberative democracy to thrive is through a public forum doctrine and for governments 
to "take steps to ensure that people are exposed to a diversity of views", including unwanted 
and unplanned experiences.[68] For Sunstein the public forum doctrine "increases the 
likelihood that people will generally be exposed to a wide variety of people and views" [69]. 
He warns about the outcome where the "Daily Me" results in reinforcement of narrow 
interests that cultural balkanization and group polarization. [70] Two independent studies 
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have shown that members of a deliberating group take a more extreme position in the same 
direction as their inclinations before deliberation began.[71] 
CyberTurfing does not operate in a social vacuum. A campaign interacts emphatically with 
social processes. [72] The first of those processes involves the spread of deception across 
digitally mediated platforms. The second includes the role of heuristics, and in particular, 
users' use of mental shortcuts when making commercial decisions. CyberTurfing relies on 
natural human interdependence and the importance of the collective. Agents of 
CyberTurfing do this by targeting specific, separate individuals. It is the "Daily Me" in the 
reverse. This abuse of the collective is a manifestation of abuse of the modern 
telecommunications network. The nature of the Internet's architecture has ensured that 
functional communities exist without being held back by the geography of real space. The 
Internet is intimately and inseparably connected to social relations and the communities 
within, from its physical layer which is specific to each country to political and social uses. 
This "networked individualism" allows for a new kind of community support. Networked 
individualism is defined by Castells in two ways: through weak and strong ties. Through 
either kind of connection, the Internet, according to Castells, forms and strengthens bonds 
between people who share common experience or interest. At the heart of this is social 
media which facilitates a certain kinship amongst people and interest groups. They share 
characteristics such as variant levels of user participation and interaction among various 
users and interest groups and resolve the barrier that the lack of spatial density presents to 
efficient real world communications. The ease of communication is a benefit of the cheap 
and efficient platform that social media provides. Furthermore, the problem presented by 
group boundaries is removed by the links between multiple networks. [73] As Wellman et al 
notes, the "Hierarchies are flatter and more recursive": 
"Rather than relating to one group, they cycle through interactions with a variety of others, 
at work or in the community. Their work and community networks are diffuse, sparsely 
knit, with vague, overlapping, social and spatial boundaries. The technological development 
of computer networks and the societal flourishing of social networks are affording the rise of 
networked individualism in a positive feedback loop. Just as the flexibility of less-bounded, 
spatially dispersed, social networks creates demand for collaborative communication and 
information sharing, the rapid development of computer-communications networks 
nourishes societal transitions from group-based societies to network-based societies." [74] 
Castells notes, "The most important role of the Internet in structuring social relationships is 
its contribution to the new pattern of sociability based on individualism."[75] This is a 
natural outcome of the openness of the Internet's architecture, something Castells describes 
as the source of its main strength.[76] The architecture of social media can be said to be 
deployed in a limited and resource light manner. The 140 character limit of the Twitter 
platform (with its limited features) form a schematic that allow humans to organize and 
spread simple and complex and intricate knowledge with limited cognitive thoughts. 
Returning to Castells, Twitter and other social media platforms are organized into two 
hierarchies: people follow Twitter accounts or make friends on Facebook because either (1) 
they know the person or account personally, or (2) because they have an interest in the 
person or account. This interest might be morbid curiosity, or might be through a genuine 
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interest in the person's account because of a direct connection with a person considered to be 
a close tie or personal relationship. 
Unlike spam, another form of direct marketing, there is though no suggestion that 
CyberTurfing is a resource-based or utility-based problem, although there are some 
estimates that bots now make up to 50 per cent of all internet traffic.[77] It is a problem of 
deception. CyberTurfing targets influential Internet users directly with an aim to get the 
user to re-tweet a tweet of propaganda with the aim of creating a cascade. Sunstein defines 
an availability cascade as a "self-reinforcing process of collective belief formation by which 
an expressed perception triggers a chain reaction that gives the perception increasing 
plausibility through its rising availability in public discourse". [78] He calls these agents 
"availability entrepreneurs - activists who manipulate the content of public discourse - strive 
to trigger availability cascades likely to advance their agendas". [79] Their availability 
campaigns may yield social benefits, but sometimes they bring harm, which suggests a need 
for safeguards. CyberTurfing is interference, or harm, a deceit on the rational actor in the 
online environment. 
What distinguishes CyberTurfing from true commercial dialogue is the manner in which the 
information spreads. Twitter has recently been considered as case study for information 
diffusion. Galuba's study takes into account user behaviour, user influence, and resource 
virulence to predict the spread of URLs through the social network. [80] Morris's study on 
infectious diseases on Twitter showed that rumours gradually acquired more credibility as 
more and more network neighbours acquire them. After some time, a threshold is crossed 
and the rumour is believed to be true within a community.[81] For Castells, the network 
society has become a basic unit of modern society - the network is influenced by political, 
cultural, and economic variables. Power relationships are the foundations of social 
organization in all societies and throughout history communication information have been 
fundamental sources of power and counter power; domination and social change. The 
fundamental battle is over the mind of the people. The way people think determine the fate 
of the values, norms, and institutions are founded. 
Furthermore, research has shown that social media has surpassed traditional media as a 
trusted source of information. [82] This trust is paramount. Many younger people don't look 
for news anymore as the younger demographics rely on the collective wisdom of the herd. 
Their 'Daily Me' is determined through connection and relationship. News will be sent to 
them by their network of friends, not by seeking it out themselves. This is due to the 
tendency of traditional media to be low engagement, but high reach. Conversely, social 
media is high engagement and low reach. Social media may have a 
higher potential audience, but the rate of visibility to that audience is incredibly low. To 
compensate for this, social media platforms incorporate sharing into their design, whereas 
revenue assumptions of traditional media platforms are based on costs of delivering the 
service -- but because the cost of distribution technologies is significantly higher, business 
models have been developed that incorporate an equation that calculates how much it is 
going to cost to reach each user. This trust and sharing facility is rooted too in heuristics. 
Twitter's architecture is based in a large part on re-tweeting other people's tweets. The 
practical effect of this element of Twitter's architecture is that a retweet of a person's tweet is 
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potentially visible to everyone. On Facebook, the 'liking' system and notification box ensure 
that 'likes' are visible beyond the initial user publication. Both systems contribute to a type of 
heuristic called the multiple source effect which occurs when people give more credence to 
ideas that appear validated by multiple sources. [83] The effects of social influence 
furthermore can be seen in the tendency of large groups to conform to choices which may be 
either correct or mistaken, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as herd behaviour. 
Although social proof reflects a rational motive to take into account the information 
possessed by others, formal analysis shows that it can cause people to converge too quickly 
upon a single choice, so that decisions of even large groups of individuals may be grounded 
in very little information. This helps form an information cascade where a small notional 
belief within a network can contribute to a cascade based on either a reputational or an 
informational cascade. [84]What is needed to tackle CyberTurfing is a socio-legal-techno 
triumvirate of regulation to ensure compliance in the online environment. This approach 
removes the need for the regulator to enter into the domain of regulating speech. If a 
CyberTurfer is operating for a commercial benefit, then the messenger should be subject to 
further regulation, rather than the message. 
A REGULATORY SOLUTION 
Any regulatory action to tackle the problem of CyberTurfing requires a three-pronged 
solution implemented through social, legal and technological means. One of the key 
challenges of social media (and for its supporters) is determining how to assess the quality 
of the information delivered to users. Making users understand the inherent danger in 
blindly reading and internalising any type of digitally mediated message is a noble, but 
unachievable, aim; however, informing users of the consequences of republishing an 
AstroTurf message is not. Socioeconomics assumes people's preferences and predispositions 
are partly formed by social norms and can change over time. This stands in contrast to neo-
classicists who assume users' preferences are given and fixed.[85] The assumption for neo-
classicists is that people are free and rational agents. [86] As Etzioni states, "if the preferences 
themselves are changeable by social and historical factors and processes that the actor is 
neither aware of nor controls, the actor's behaviour may be non-rational and not free". [87] In 
socioeconomics; however, norms are internalized through a process during which an actor 
will learn to follow rules without threats of external sanctions.[88] Social norms can be seen 
as regulating, constraining, or reinforcing behaviour.[89] As CyberTurfing is a form of 
online persuasion campaign, neo-classicists must accept that it falls into one of two 
categories. For the neo-classicists CyberTurfing is a strictly informational form of advertising 
and should not affect people's preferences. If the alternative was true, neo-classicists would 
have to admit that people adopt messages of persuasion by internalising the message. 
Accordingly, users can no longer be considered rational actors that the neoclassical 
paradigm assumes them to be. After all, the consequences of manipulation depend upon the 
CyberTurfer's intent, which may well be to exploit rather than to ameliorate and also upon 
the effectiveness of the CyberTurf in question. For socio-economists CyberTurfing is a form 
of informational advertising with a persuasive element, such as outlining an opposition 
opponent's position on a controversial issue. As opposed to the advertiser who is using 
information and persuasion in their commercial message, the CyberTurfer is using 
informational and deception in their message to reinforce existing social norms. However, 
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social norms, and in particular, cyber-based norms take a while to become internalized. 
Norms, according to Eric Posner "constrain attempts to satisfy their 
preferences".[90] Furthermore, norms have social meanings and according to Lessig supply 
benefits and impose costs to individuals and groups.[91] Sunstein rationalizes norms as 
either a subsidy or a tax.[92] 
In some social media environments, information is guarded and an individual's assessment 
of message is based on the strength of the connections between receiver and sender. 
However, in other social media environments, proprietary platforms are designed to ensure 
unfettered connections without any filtering of the messages communicated. There are little 
limitations on the openness of the platform and the recipient may not have any tools as to 
gauge its validity or reliability. As already discussed at length above, using heuristics can 
lead to errors in judgement. AstroTurfing campaigns relies on a series of heuristics that may 
make people to alter their normal decision making process. For example, someone interested 
in promoting an AstroTurf message wants to establish a false sense of group consensus 
about a particular idea.[93] The consensus heuristic is best summed up in the expression, "if 
other people believe it then it must be true". This bias is commonly present in a group 
setting where one thinks the collective opinion of their own group matches that of the larger 
population. Since the members of a group reach consensus, rarely encountering those who 
dispute it, they tend to believe that everybody thinks the same way. As an extension, when 
confronted with evidence that a consensus does not exist, people often assume that the 
others who do not agree with them are defective in some way. There is no single cause for 
this cognitive bias; the availability heuristic, coupled with self-serving bias, have been 
suggested as partial underlying factors. Related to this process is the fact that users are more 
likely to believe a message that they perceive as coming from several independent sources, 
or from an acquaintance (the common knowledge effect). 
Benkler has argued that some systems of accreditation through commons based peer 
production system could contribute a possible solution. Users "cooperate to provide 
information, knowledge or cultural goods without relying on either market pricing or 
managerial hierarchies to coordinate their common enterprise".[94] In the Open Source 
Software community, a programmer's reputation is at stake and a good piece of code will 
earn its developer certain clout. This has the effect of ensuring that online nicknames are 
fiercely guarded among the community.[95] In both of these examples, a form of self-
regulation has developed among the community. Legitimacy has come from within and the 
authority has come to guard against the erosion of confidence in the information that is 
accessed.[96] For example, the system of customer rankings on Amazon, Benkler suggests, is 
a way to solve information degradation[97]. 
The second phase would be to tackle the problem of CyberTurfing through technological 
solutions. As May notes, "one of the key challenges for supporters of openness is to find 
ways of delivering the quality-related quick and ready assessments that previously were 
delivered via proprietary modes of assuring the origins of information and knowledge. The 
bounds or limits of openness are likely to vary with the (social) importance of establishing 
the reliability of the information and knowledge elements of any specific product, service or 
knowledge."[98] Spam detection systems often focus on the content of a potential spam 
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message-for instance, to see if the message contains a certain link or set of tags. To better 
detect CyberTurfing, regulators could encourage further development of systems designed 
to examine how messages are delivered rather than its content; for example, looking for 
"retweeting anomalies" and mapping tweets that rapidly ascend to become "trending 
topics". Identifying potential targets is paramount of any technical solution as influencers 
will often be the target of the attack. Gomez-Rodriguez, Leskovec, and Krause have 
proposed algorithms that can efficiently approximate linkage information based on the 
times at which specific URLs appear in a network of news sites. [99]Boutet, Kim, and 
Yonecki examined 1,150,000 messages from 220,000 users and were able to determine with 
86% accuracy their political leanings.[100]. Their retweet graph presented a highly 
segregated partisan structure with party members more likely to make reference to their 
own party than other parties. The same analysis can be deployed to determine brand loyalty 
and the likelihood of making a commercial transaction. By identifying a network of users 
that may be susceptible to attack, monitors should be able to see CyberTurfing as it happens. 
Despite the fact that many of the examples of CyberTurfing discussed in this paper are 
characterized by small diffusion networks, it is important to note that this is the stage at 
which such attempts at deception must be identi?ed. CyberTurfing detection systems have 
been "devised to automatically monitor the data stream from Twitter, detect relevant 
"memes", collect the tweets that match themes of interest, and produce basic statistical 
features relative to patterns of diffusion."[101] A potential shortcoming of present 
technological solutions is once an attempt is successful at gaining the attention of the 
community, CyberTurfing patterns become "indistinguishable from an organic" pattern. The 
early identi?cation and termination of accounts associated with CyberTurfing is critical. 
Finally, watchdogs could deploy legal strategies regulating entities engaged in political 
marketing for a commercial benefit by amending election law. Commercial entities that 
orchestrate campaigns on behalf of individual candidates or political parties (or a party list 
at a London Assembly election) are regulated under Section 75 of the Representation of the 
People Act 1983 (RPA). Although spending is controlled for the 365 days ending with the 
date of poll for UK Parliamentary general elections and for four months preceding an 
election for the other types of regulated elections, currently, party and issue-based 
campaigning is regulated only at relevant elections. The law could quickly and easily be 
expanded to cover currently unregulated periods. Secondly, electoral regulators should 
mandate transparency about the relationship between the marketing company and their 
political affiliation and backers. These organisations should file disclosure with the regulator 
as done in the US with the UK's Electoral Commission. This means that governments may 
bypass both political opposition and judicial scrutiny of state actions as any plan to require a 
regulator to curtail freedom of speech would no doubt immediately encounter political 
opposition. Therefore, a possible solution would be for the electoral commission to engage 
in co-regulation. [102] In practice, this would involve political marketing groups agreeing to 
a code of practice - enforceable by the UK Electoral Commission - mandating that the court 
(empowered by legislation) may order that social media sites close the accounts of those 
practicing deceptive marketing. The purpose of the regulation would be two-fold. The 
political marketer would be provided immunity from civil liability for acting 
(in)appropriately(?) and political parties are removed from discussions on accountability for 
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the decision to block or suspend accounts (taken by the SNS) or materials used to justify 
blocking (compiled by the Electoral Commission). In turn, political marketers could forestall 
legislative mandates that might be more onerous by entering into a timely voluntary 
arrangement; could present themselves as protecting the democratic integrity of the election 
process, and could also place the onus for the decisions on the UK Electoral Commission. By 
imposing a legal duty to disclose this information to regulators, a criminal charge could be 
made under Section 3 of the Fraud Act, if the entity practicing CyberTurfing in a political 
context was operating for a commercial benefit. 
It is expected that corporations operating within the UK's borders refrain from deceptive 
behaviour, and this is reflected in the current consumer protection and commercial 
regulatory framework. The regulatory framework doesn't address organizations disguising 
commercial speech motivated by economic gains as political speech. Regulating 
CyberTurfing in this manner circumvents regulating social media. This is because, contrary 
to Marshall McLuhan's phrase, CyberTurfing is about the medium and the message.[103] 
CONCLUSION 
The Competition and Market Authority estimated that £23billion a year of UK consumer 
spending is potentially influenced by online reviews. [104]The review sector form an 
important part of consumer decision-making processes with 68% of respondents finding 
online reviews of hotels and travel operators finding 'much more important' or 'a little more 
important' than other sources of information.[105] A number of economic papers cited by 
the CMA report suggests that reviews play a crucial part of consumer decision 
making.[106] There is a growing concern at the CMA that some review practices prevent 
consumers from making the most optimal choice when selecting a product or service. Some 
of the manipulation of consumer online review systems results in loss of business 
custom.[107] Although the manipulation of online review systems has triggered an 
investigation after consultation by the Competition Market Authority[108], the terms of the 
report only cover one form of CyberTurfing. But it is a start of a long and overdue analysis 
of the way digitally mediated platforms are being manipulated in order to help spread 
political and commercial propaganda and advertising through deceptive practices. Will the 
CMA investigation expand itself to examine further forms of exploitative practices? Or will 
the problem of CyberTurfing remain unaddressed for now, leaving commercial actors to 
their own devices to manipulate consumers and advance their commercial agendas? The 
next steps in the review by the CMA present an opportunity to 'fix' some of the problems 
found in the online review system, but a lack of the recognition of the problem by other 
national regulators is frustrating and dubious. Without any oversight and regulatory 
controls, with more knowledge gained everyday about our overreliance on heuristics and 
mental shortcuts when making judgements, our ability to make rational commercial 
decisions is being compromised. Until action is taken, it may be that the one with the best 
bot wins. 
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